the district is derived from agriculture and animal husbandry, and that the surplus production so obtained is marketed directly to Erbil or through a number of local centers, of which Rowanduz has major importance. As a channel of trade, however, between Erbil and the producers, the town must also depend to a certain extent on a profitable commerce with the villagers, either through its bazar or its itinerant traders. Here, too, volume has fallen, and two reasons can be cited, the first of which is the rise of Dyana. This village, the strongest mercantile competitor of Rowanduz, arose on lands owned by Lali Khan near a British rest-camp constructed during the second World War and now abandoned. Dyana is now sought out, at the expense of Rowanduz, for a very cogent reason. It is customary for a villager to have a continuous debt, usually five or ten dinars, with a merchant, paid off again and again and just as often recontracted. Many villagers now go to Dyana by reason of such a sum owed in Rowanduz, not because they wish to escape payment, but to obtain a desired respite and expansion of credit. Dyana is also easier of access from the new main road than Rowanduz, and this may contribute to its popularity. Whether or not the villagers will sooner or later exhaust their credit in Dyana and return to their old market is difficult to say.

Second, in Ottoman times there were thirty or forty Jewish households in Rowanduz and they continued in these numbers until the coming of the Israeli War in Palestine. Most were skilled craftsmen and their departure for Israel,

although the Israeli is universally despised, brought a decline in the variety and quality of craftsmanship in Rowanduz freely confessed and regretted by the townspeople. A man who now wishes to purchase such things as gold jewelry for his wife must travel to Erbil. [301]

It must be admitted that the strength of the town as a center based on village trade is precarious, and much of the commercial activity with importance in district economy has been replaced by service to the government personnel and the several wealthy landowners who reside within it. In brief, the economic realignments of the first World War have changed the bases of the size and importance of Rowanduz. Once these were primarily commercial, and only secondarily political, while today a reversal of this position has taken place. The increased influence of the government, which is a matter of numbers, into everyday life has introduced into the town a new income without whose supplement Rowanduz might have experienced certain decline.

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enforced. Of the non-Muslims, the Jews might be mentioned first, and their own custom of marriage is like that of Islam. By long tradition, heightened by the recent Israeli war, the Jews are greatly despised, but most of them have already migrated to their new country. The departure of the Jewish craftsmen and shopkeepers from Rowanduz has already been noticed. Of the Christians, an unconscious distinction is made in the Muslim mind between those who come from the Western world, and those who are native to the area or the Eastern Mediterranean. The military prowess and advanced culture of Europe or America are recognized, and almost any male from these countries is ipso facto an effendi or gentleman. The Briton, because of the part of his country's imperialism in the Middle East, may be disliked, but he is usually respected. On the other hand, Christians such as the Armenians, Chaldaeans, Greeks, and Nestorians, who have been Islamic subjects in the past, are looked upon with some contempt. The Armenians and Greeks are largely urban minorities, engaged in commerce, and are generally vilified, as are Jews and certain Syrians in the cities, as cheats and thieves. The Chaldaeans and the Nestorians, most of the latter displaced from their homeland in Turkey after the first World War, were once exclusively engaged in agriculture, and, as a peaceful folk, were not considered particularly different from Muslim peasants. Kurdish chieftains and their men have been invited to Nestorian festivals and there has been

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considerable social intercourse between the two groups. 186 563 571
Unfortunately, the Nestorians, unable to find land in Iraq, took service with the British, particularly in the infantry levy battalions, and had a part, among other things, in crushing two Kurdish revolts. There are many of them settled in the Rowanduz area, at Batas, Dara Harir and Dyana, and, while outwardly amicable, the Kurds feel toward them a certain amount of distrust and, in view of their alliance with the British, especially in the lucrative occupations of the Iraq Petroleum Company, jealousy. For their part, [167] the Nestorians live in fear of massacre, and as many as are able migrate abroad. The Christians of this native [582] group are just as adamant in the matter of the marriage of their daughters to Muslims as the Muslims are toward them. One can find Muslims in Baghdad with American, British, or German wives, but never Armenian or Chaldaean.

There is a curious sociological fact to be seen here. 627 837 548
Muslim girls who become prostitutes (in fact, any Muslim woman whose reputation has been questioned) are in imminent danger of being slain by their relatives, and the Baghdad press is filled daily with such killings. Thus most of [553] them assume Christian names, often of a cinema favorite, and wear a cross conspicuously at the throat, changing outwardly their religion to avoid detection. Islam 771 commands tremendous respect from its followers and is a 578 "proud" religion, one of warriors and conquerors. A Muslim may be cursed by a non-Muslim to a certain point,

14: Ivanov E-5 (no date) 1926 MA1 Iran MA1
Kurd MA11

now remain; there are only a few degenerate and impoverished families in the south of the province, constituting a starving nomad tribe.

The Turks are still numerous, and there are many invaders of quite recent origin, such as the Kurds, who came here in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Timuris and the Baluchis, who extended their wanderings further and further north. The latest immigrants are Mongols, the so-called Barbaris, or Hazara, who are still continuing to come in numbers. It will be better to deal with each tribe separately.

Kurds.—It is difficult to find if any Kurdish tribes were living in Khurasan before the beginning of the sixteenth century. In the surnames of many different celebrities who are natives of this province the term "Kurt" is often met with. Even a dynasty of this name ruled south of Herat in the hill districts (643–791 A.H., or 1245–1389 A.D.). Kurd and Kurt are undoubtedly the same as they are to-day; but if there had been some Kurdish people in Khurasan, they must have mixed with Persians. When under the Safawides the necessity arose of defending the northern frontier of Khurasan against the inroads of the powerful Uzbegs and Turkomans, local means were not sufficient, and the Shahs tried to institute a measure similar to that of the Cossacks in Russia, *i.e.* they settled some warlike and virile people in the threatened area. Therefore some tribes of Kurds from Kurdistan proper were transferred as early as the middle of the sixteenth century. In the beginning of the seventeenth century a new party had arrived; some of these tribes still live there, like the Kaiwanlu, the Shadillu, etc. Some more of them arrived later on in the eighteenth century, under Nadir (like the 'Amarlu). At present there is no connection with the West, and the Khurasani Kurds are gradually undergoing "Turkomanization."

With regard to the racial and tribal names, it may be observed that they are utterly unreliable for the purpose of establishing any conclusions to ethnical connections. The tribe is usually called after the surname of the chief or of the place of settlement, and very soon the whole of the tribe, to which several sub-divisions belong, becomes named after the section which was most prominent and important among them. In practice there is nothing more difficult than obtaining exact information of the name of a tribe with its sub-divisions. In Khurasan the difficulty is still greater because there are no distinct sub-dialects, and the idiom of the Kurds appears practically uniform. Many sub-sections are closely connected with the Turks, and experience real difficulty in deciding whether they are of Kurdish or Turkish nationality.

These continual changes of names make it difficult to draw up a systematic table of sub-division. Of the four tribes which are traditionally regarded as the original, namely 'Amarlu, Za'faranlu, Shadillu and Kaiwanlu, the first and last appear to-day as small tribes, while the other two are mostly Turkish-speaking and have ceased to be regarded as Kurds. The following list gives an approximate idea as to the present principal

21; Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Kurd MA 11

Kurdish State and not communist. It existed for only nine months, despite the Treaty of Alliance for twenty years which it had concluded with another Soviet-sponsored government, the autonomous administration of Persian Azerbaidzhan.

Even such short-lived experiments as the Kurdish Republic of 1946 can become an important factor in the national tradition of a people, who, like the Kurds, are living under foreign rule. Experiments of that kind are apt to create a myth which ultimately may have a greater impact on the national development of the people than the original event itself. From year to year the Kurdish Republic of Quazi Mohammed may appear to the Kurds more splendid and more powerful, particularly if Soviet propaganda does its share by reminding the Kurds of the downfall of 'their' republic and recalling the part which Russia played in its foundation. Soviet propaganda is indeed taking every opportunity of referring back to the glorious times when two pictures decorated the walls of the houses of many a Kurdish sheikh – that of Quazi Mohammed, the Kurdish leader, hanged by the Persians in March 1947, and that of Generalissimo Stalin.[56]

Despite the collapse of 'Free Kurdistan' Soviet Russia has nevertheless made great progress in mastering the Kurdish problem. Kurdish chieftains became acquainted with Soviet institutions and Soviet ideology while the Russian occupation of Persia's Kurdish territories lasted. Many Persian Kurds joined their countrymen already living in Soviet Transcaucasia and Kurdish culture 'national in form and socialist in content' developed: 200 Kurdish pamphlets and books had been published in the Soviet Union by 1949.[57] Nor was there any shortage of qualified Kurdish personnel in the Soviet Union after the war. On the contrary, Soviet propaganda was able to boast of Kurdish 'state dignitaries and outstanding workers in culture and science', who had sprung up among the Russian Kurds. A Kurdish Soviet poet, Amin Avdal, is the 'author of wonderful verses on the Soviet homeland'. Another Kurdish poet, Jasmeh Jalil, translated Russian classics into his native tongue. A Kurdish philologist, Nure Pulatova, a graduate of Leningrad University, became the only Kurdish woman scholar in the world.[58] And lastly, between 1946 and 1950 the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. included a Kurdish deputy, Samand Alievich Siabandov.

However important the recent Soviet experiments with the Russian Kurds may be, the latter represent not even 5 per cent of the entire Kurdish people. Soviet Russia must bring either the Turkish or the Persian Kurds within her orbit if she wants to make a success of her 'Kurdish policy'. It remains to be seen whether the political dynamic of the U.S.S.R. and the ideological power of Bolshevism will be sufficient to accomplish this aim.